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A DISASTROUS REJECTION: THE CASE FOR INCLUDING 
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS UNDER THE STAFFORD ACT’S 
INDIVIDUALS AND HOUSEHOLDS PROGRAM 
Jacob J. Franchino* 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
In the waning days of October 2012, the hurricane-turned-post-
tropical-cyclone, since referred to as “Super-Storm Sandy” (“Sandy”), 
carved its way through the Caribbean and up the East Coast of the 
United States before finally making landfall on New Jersey’s coast.1  
The devastation wrought by Sandy was significant; at final tally, the 
storm resulted in 147 deaths, damage, and destruction to at least 
650,000 homes, and massive power outages affecting millions of 
residents.2 
While Sandy’s wrath certainly cast a wide net, the damage to New 
Jersey and New York was particularly severe.  New York’s infrastructure 
was severely impacted, including, among other things, significant 
flooding to streets, major subway lines, and airports.3  Similarly, on the 
other side of the Hudson, Sandy caused an estimated $400 million in 
damage to New Jersey’s public transportation system.4  Across both 
states, the storm devastated beaches, roads, parks, and utilities.5 
 
 
* J.D., 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Rutgers, The State 
University of New Jersey.  I would like to offer special thanks to Professor Angela C. 
Carmella for the guidance and feedback she provided me during the writing process.  
I would also like to thank Jennifer Randolph for all of her help during the editing 
process. 
 1 See, e.g., Doyle Rice, Weather Lessons from Super Storm Sandy, USA TODAY (Oct. 28, 
2013, 10:28 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2013/10/26/weather-
hurricane-superstorm-sandy/3178777/. 
 2  Kathryn D. Sullivan & Louis W. Uccellini, Hurricane/Post-Tropical Cyclone Sandy, 
October 22-29, 2012, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (May 
2013), http://www.nws.noaa.gov/os/assessments/pdfs/Sandy13.pdf.  
 3  Id. 
 4  Id. 
 5  See, e.g., Ginger Adams Otis, Hurricane Sandy, One Year Later: Tracing the 
Superstorm’s Path from Inception to Destruction, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 26, 2013, 5:27 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/hurricane-sandy/sandy-1-year-storm-winds-
article-1.1495677. 
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The immensity of Sandy’s public devastation was matched only by 
its cost.  With approximately $50 billion in damages, Sandy was the 
second costliest weather event in American history, behind only 
Hurricane Katrina.6  Among a number of other public assistance grants 
stemming from Sandy (totaling about $1.7 billion), the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) estimates that it provided 
almost $20 million to the New York Department of Transportation for 
debris removal, almost $5 million to the Long Beach Medical Center, 
$2.5 million to the New York City Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene, and over $451,000 to the Hudson River Park Trust to repair 
its facilities.7 
Perhaps even more concerning than the public destruction and 
cost accompanying Sandy’s arrival was the storm’s impact on the 
private community.  According to the National Hurricane Center, 
“[t]he extent of catastrophic damage along the New Jersey coast was 
unprecedented in the state’s history,” adding that, “[w]hole 
communities were inundated by water and sand, houses were washed 
from their foundations . . . .”8  In the storm’s aftermath, over five 
million homes went without power, with outages often lasting for 
weeks.9  Approximately 346,000 housing units sustained at least some 
damage, and state officials deemed 22,000 of them uninhabitable.10  In 
New York, the story was similar.  Governor Cuomo estimated that an 
astonishing 305,000 homes in the state were destroyed in the storm, 
most by Sandy’s powerful surge.11 
Portending catastrophes like Sandy, Congress passed the Robert 
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the “Stafford 
Act”) with the purpose of “[alleviating] the suffering and damage” 
resulting from disasters by “providing Federal assistance programs for 
both public and private losses sustained in disasters.”12  Notably, 
through its Individuals and Households Program (“IHP”), the Stafford 
Act permits the distribution of federal grants to homeowners for both 
 
 6  Rice, supra note 1.  
 7  Public Assistance By the Numbers, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Aug. 23, 2013, 
3:22 PM), http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2013/08/23/public-assistance 
numbers.  
 8  ERIC S. BLAKE, TODD B. KIMBERLAIN, ROBERT J. BERG, JOHN P. CANGIALOSI & JOHN 
L. BEVEN II, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE SANDY 17 
(2013), available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
5121(b)(6) (West 2013). 
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repairs and replacements of “owner-occupied” private residences 
damaged by a major disaster.13  According to its most recent reports, 
FEMA provided a combined $13 billion in total federal aid to the 
recovery efforts in New York and New Jersey.14  Of this total figure, $996 
million of New York’s total aid15 and $412 million of New Jersey’s total 
aid has gone towards “individuals and households” claims.16 
While FEMA has distributed a substantial amount of assistance for 
“individuals and households” thus far, a regional peculiarity has 
revealed a gap in the IHP.  A substantial number of homeowners in 
the New York area own homes in common interest communities (i.e., 
planned communities, housing cooperatives, and condominiums).17  
To various extents, common interest communities possess a certain 
level of collectively owned property, which is held by and managed 
through a community association.18  The gap in disaster coverage is 
manifest in FEMA’s view of community associations.19  While 
community associations are almost always non-profit organizations, 
composed exclusively of the homeowners in a given community,20 
FEMA views them as businesses.21  Because they are viewed as such, 
community associations are not eligible for federal aid under the IHP.22  
This is especially problematic for homeowners in common interest 
communities with shared property elements such as outside walls, 
roofs, or other essential elements of the home’s infrastructure.23 
 
 
 13  § 5174 (c)(2)–(3).  
 14  See New Jersey Recovery From Superstorm Sandy: By the Numbers, FED. EMERGENCY 
MGMT. AGENCY (Sept. 9, 2013, 3:09 PM), http://www.fema.gov/news-
release/2013/09/03/new-jersey-recovery-superstorm-sandy-numbers (estimating total 
federal aid to New Jersey at $5.6 billion); New York: By the Numbers-42, FED. EMERGENCY 
MGMT. AGENCY (Aug. 29, 2013, 3:07 PM), http://www.fema.gov/news-
release/2013/08/29/new-york-numbers-42 (estimating total federal aid to New York 
at over $8 billion) [hereinafter New York: By the Numbers]. 
 15  See New York: By the Numbers, supra note 14.  
 16  See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 14.  
 17  Michael H. Schill, Ioan Voicu, & Jonathan Miller, The Condominium Versus 
Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 
275, 276 (2007). 
 18  JESSE DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY 896 (7th ed. 2010). 
 19  Mireya Navarro, U.S. Rules Bar Aid to Co-ops Hit by Sandy, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2013, 
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/nyregion/fema-policy-keeps-
co-ops-from-disaster-aid.html?pagewanted=all. 
 20  See DUKEMINIER, supra note 18. 
 21  See Navarro, supra note 19. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
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The confluence of the New York area’s peculiar housing situation, 
the Stafford Act’s failure to explicitly include community associations 
under IHP coverage, and FEMA’s designation of such associations as 
businesses is preventing thousands of condominium and housing 
cooperative owners in New York and New Jersey from receiving the full 
benefit of federal disaster grants.24  After this gap in coverage became 
apparent, lawmakers in the New York area, anxious for relief, worked 
to create an amendment to the Stafford Act that would grant 
condominium and housing cooperatives the same coverage under the 
IHP as other homeowners.25  This Comment argues that, because 
community associations are more appropriately viewed as extensions 
of their members as property owners, the proposed amendment to the 
Stafford Act should be passed in order to equally protect all 
homeowners from the burdens attendant to major disaster events. 
Part II of this Comment explores the different types of common 
interest communities and their unique legal status.  Part III outlines 
the nature of the federal aid generally available to homeowners under 
the Stafford Act’s IHP.  Part IV seizes upon the example of Hurricane 
Sandy to demonstrate the disastrous effects of the gap in coverage for 
common interest communities under the Stafford Act and elaborates 
on the amendments proposed to correct it.  Finally, by demonstrating 
the impracticality of viewing community associations as businesses and 
thus preventing them the benefit of IHP grants, Part V lends support 
to the legislative effort to amend the Act so as to include condominium 
associations and housing cooperatives.  Part VI concludes. 
II. THE LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS OF COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES 
As of 2012, approximately 25.9 million housing units in the 
United States were in common interest communities.26  Nearly 64 
million residents live across the nation’s 323,600 common interest 
 
 24  See Maura McDermott, HUD to Allow Co-ops, Condos to Get Federal Sandy Help, 
NEWSDAY, Mar. 6, 2013, at A05, http://www.newsday.com/classifieds/real-estate/hud-
to-allow-co-ops-condos-to-get-federal-sandy-help-1.4764563.  
 25  H.R. 2887, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1480, 113th Cong. (2013).  See Press Release, 
Rep. Steve Israel, Rep. Israel Announces Legislation to Make Co-Ops and Condos 
Eligible for Storm Recovery Grants (July 29, 2013), available at http://israel. 
house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rep-israel-announces-legislation-to-make-co-
ops-and-condos-eligible-for.  
 26  Statistical Review 2012:  For U.S. Homeowners Associations, Condominium 
Communities and Housing Cooperatives, National and State Data, FOUND. FOR CMTY. ASS’N 
RESEARCH (2012), http://www.cairf.org/foundationstatsbrochure.pdf.  
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communities, and over the last half-century that number has 
continued to grow.27  In New York and New Jersey alone, there are a 
combined 19,000 common interest communities, accounting for 
almost six percent of common interest communities nationwide.28 
Common interest communities are “[r]eal-estate development[s] 
or neighborhood[s] in which individually owned lots or units are 
burdened by a servitude that imposes an obligation that cannot be 
avoided by nonuse or withdrawal.”29  All common interest communities 
are unified by three characteristics.  First, membership in a community 
association is required for all individual owners within that particular 
community.30  Second, each owner in a community is legally bound, by 
the same governing documents, to honor mutual obligations between 
owners and the community association.31  Finally, each owner in a 
community contributes economically to the community association, 
which represents the collective.32  Summed up, “[t]he distinctive 
feature of a common-interest community is the obligation that binds 
the owners of individual lots or units to contribute to the support of 
common property, or other facilities . . . whether or not the owner uses 
the common property or facilities, or agrees to join the association.”33  
There are three primary types of common interest community found 
in America today: (1) planned communities; (2) condominiums; and 
(3) housing cooperatives.34  Each of these types will be addressed in 
kind. 
In planned communities, homeowners generally have exclusive 
ownership of the lot they purchased and the detached housing unit 
atop it; their purchase, however, also requires that they be members in 
the governing community association.35  With ownership of the lot and 
unit in the hands of individual owners, the common areas in a planned 
community are typically recreational areas, grounds, and, in some 
cases, roads that are owned by the association.36  Since homeowners in 
 
 27  Id. 
 28  Id. 
 29  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000). 
 30  An Introduction to Community Association Living, CMTY. ASS’NS INST. 4 (2006), 
http://www.caionline.org/events/boardmembers/Documents/IntroToCALiving 
.pdf. 
 31  Id. at 4. 
 32  Id. 
 33  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  SERVITUDES § 6.2 cmt. a (2000). 
 34  See CMTY. ASS’NS INST., supra note 30, at 6. 
 35  Id. at 6–7. 
 36  Id. 
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planned communities individually own their entire lot and housing 
unit, their homes are covered under the IHP.37  Any property the 
owners do share, such as recreational areas and grounds,38 are not of 
the type that the IHP would cover even if individually owned.39 
Unlike planned communities, condominium ownership involves 
a greater degree of shared ownership.40  Put generally, the interior 
space of each unit in a condominium community belongs exclusively 
to the individual homeowner, while the remaining areas are owned 
collectively by all unit owners, as tenants in common.41  Thus, in most 
circumstances the physical boundaries of a unit and the land upon 
which it rests are the domain of the community association.42  Under 
the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, upon which some 
states have modeled their own statutes,43 a common interest 
community is not a condominium “unless the undivided interests in 
the common elements are vested in the unit owners.”44  Thus, in the 
case of condominiums, quite literally, the common areas are co-owned 
by the individual unit owners.45 
Condominiums can take a variety of different forms.46  They might 
be apartment buildings, townhouses, or, less frequently, detached 
single-family dwellings.47  The makeup of a given condominium 
 
 37  42 U.S.C.A. § 5174 (c)(2)•(3) (West 2013).  See also FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. 
AGENCY, Help After A Disaster: Applicant’s Guide to the Individuals & Households Program, 
545 FEMA 5–6 (July 2008), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/assistance/process/help_ 
after_disaster_english.pdf. 
 38  See CMTY. ASS’NS INST., supra note 30, at 7. 
 39  See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 37, at 5–6.  It is worth pointing 
out here that, although individual owners in planned communities will typically qualify 
for IHP coverage, they still face a unique hardship in the aftermath of disasters.  
Following Sandy, community associations in a number of gated communities in New 
York were left with immense costs to repair damage to their communal infrastructure.  
Joseph Berger, Enclaves, Long Gated, Seek to Let In Storm Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/nyregion/new-york-city-enclaves-long-gated-
want-to-let-in-storm-aid.html?_r=0.   
 40  See CMTY. ASS’NS INST., supra note 30, at 7. 
 41  See Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel, Trust and Community: The Common Interest 
Community as Metaphor and Paradox, 72 MO. L. REV. 1111, 1115 n. 16 (2007); 
DUKENMINIER, supra note 18, at 897; see also WAYNE S. HYATT & SUSAN B. FRENCH, 
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW: CASES & MATERIALS ON COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES 
5 (2d ed. 2008). 
 42  See CMTY. ASS’NS INST., supra note 30, at 7. 
 43  See DUKENMINIER, supra note 18, at 896. 
 44  UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT §1-103 (8) (1982). 
 45  Id.; see also DUKENMINIER, supra note 18, at 897. 
 46  See CMTY. ASS’NS INST., supra note 30, at 7. 
 47  See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 41, at 1115 n.16; see also CMTY. ASS’NS INST., 
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community might have a practical effect on which property elements 
will be shared.48  Where, as in most cases, a condominium takes the 
form of an apartment building or attached townhouses, the exterior 
walls will likely be property shared in common by the individual 
owners.49  In rarer circumstances, however, individual units that are 
detached, and thus do not physically share structural portions of their 
home, are unlikely to designate exterior walls, or even their roofs, as 
common property.50  These distinctions are managed by the 
“declaration of condominium,” which is filed before any sales in a 
housing complex are made.51  Importantly, where the declaration 
designates only the interior of a unit for individual ownership, as is 
most often the case, the remaining exterior elements like walls, roofs, 
and hallways will be under the control of the community association, 
putting them at risk of falling into the IHP coverage gap.52 
Somewhat distinct from the condominium is the housing 
cooperative. In a housing cooperative, the owner of the entire 
property, including the individual unit, is the cooperative 
corporation.53  When a person buys into a housing cooperative, they 
are purchasing shares of stock in the cooperative corporation.54  The 
corporation, in which the resident is now a part-owner, then leases the 
individual unit to the resident.55  Thus, “the owner of a cooperative 
apartment is technically both the owner of shares in the cooperative 
corporation and a tenant of that corporation.”56  While it is possible for 
housing cooperatives to take different physical forms, this type of 
common interest community is almost exclusively found in apartment 
 
supra note 30, at 7.  
 48  Franzese and Siegel explain that a common interest community’s allocation of 
collectively held elements will be affected by its status as either a territorial (individual 
units spread across a large piece of real estate) or non-territorial (usually a single 
building). Franzese & Siegel, supra note 41, at 1115 n.16. 
 49 See DUKENMINIER, supra note 18, at 897. 
 50  The Community Associations Institute explains that while condominiums are 
popularly conceived of as apartment buildings, they can also take other forms such as 
a mobile home park.  In such a circumstance, the owner would individually own the 
entire mobile home structure, but would have a shared interest in all of the remaining 
property on which the unit rests.  See CMTY. ASS’NS INST., supra note 30, at 7. 
 51  See DUKENMINIER, supra note 18, at 897–98. 
 52  See Navarro, supra note 19. 
 53  Michael H. Schill, Ioan Voicu, & Jonathan Miller, The Condominium Versus 
Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 
275, 277 (2007). 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. 
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buildings.57 
 
The cooperative corporation is notable for a couple of reasons.  
First, while the cooperative owner technically “leases” a unit, it is 
anything but a typical lease.58  The leases are almost always for an 
extended period of time.59  In many circumstances, a cooperative lease 
is a “proprietary lease” entitling the lessee to perpetual occupancy of 
the unit.”60  Whatever the official length of the lease, it is evident that 
a cooperative owner’s “lease” is radically different than a renter’s lease 
from an individual property owner.61  Second, a cooperative owner’s 
stock in the corporation is freely transferable; thus, the stock and its 
accompanying right to occupancy can be sold for whatever price the 
market commands.62  A housing cooperative member “effectively has a 
perpetual, exclusive, and freely transferable property right in the 
physical unit he occupies.”63 
 The final distinctive feature of the housing cooperative form is 
that the cooperative property is typically secured by a single blanket 
mortgage for which the corporation is responsible.64  If one member 
of the cooperative fails to make payments for their individual share of 
the mortgage interest or taxes, it is up to the other members to make 
up the deficiency.65  Therefore, in housing cooperatives, the financial 
stability of the collective is very much dependent on the contribution 
of the individual. 
Despite members’ proprietary rights to occupy or sell their units 
and the corporation’s unique reliance on those members for survival, 
housing cooperatives are wholly excluded from the IHP coverage since 
virtually all of their property is collectively owned through the 
 
 57  See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 41, at 1115 n.16. 
 58  This type of lease is distinct from a typical landlord-tenant arrangement because 
in housing cooperatives the tenants own the subject building as a group and are thus 
“collectively their own landlord.”  See Henry B. Hansmann, Condominium and 
Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 25, 26 (1991). 
 59  See Schill, Voicu, & Miller, supra note 53, at 277 (describing the typical lease 
period as a “significant period of time (typically 99 years)”). 
 60  See Hansmann, supra note 58.  
 61  See id. at 26–27 (explaining that a cooperative owner’s “proprietary lease” is 
more akin to  “owner-[occupied]” property than to “ordinary landlord-tenant” 
relationships). 
 62  Id. at 26–27. 
 63  Id. 
 64  See DUKENMINIER, supra note 18, at 898. 
 65  Id.  
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corporation.66 
 
III. THE DISASTER RELIEF AVAILABLE TO QUALIFYING HOMEOWNERS 
UNDER THE STAFFORD ACT’S INDIVIDUALS AND HOUSEHOLDS PROGRAM 
Section 408 of the Stafford Act empowers FEMA to “provide 
financial assistance, and, if necessary, direct services, to individuals and 
households in the State who, as a direct result of a major disaster, have 
necessary expenses and serious needs in cases in which the individuals 
and households are unable to meet such expenses or needs through 
other means.”67  For § 408 purposes, “financial assistance” simply 
means cash grants that are provided to eligible individuals and 
households.68  While FEMA regulations allow for a relatively broad view 
of what constitutes a household,69 it is explicitly clear that the IHP 
grants are not available for business losses.70 
There are two relevant types of assistance available to individuals 
and households under the IHP.71  First, FEMA may grant financial 
assistance for “the repair of owner-occupied private residences, 
utilities, and residential infrastructure damaged by a major disaster to 
a safe and sanitary living or functioning condition.”72  A safe home is 
one that is “secure from disaster-related hazards or threats to 
occupants.”73  A sanitary home is one “free of disaster-related health 
hazards.”74  For a home to be considered functioning, it needs only to 
be “capable of being used for its intended purpose.”75  With respect to 
repairs, a victim receiving assistance is not required to show that his 
needs could have been met through other means, except with respect 
 
 66  See Navarro, supra note 19. 
 67  42 U.S.C.A. § 5174(a)(1) (West 2013). 
 68  Emergency Mgmt. and Assistance, 44 C.F.R. § 206.111 (West 2009). 
 69  Id. (defining “household” as “all persons (adults and children) who lived in the 
pre-disaster residence who request assistance under this subpart, as well as any persons, 
such as infants, spouse, or part-time residents who were not present at the time of the 
disaster, but who are expected to return during the assistance period”). 
 70  Id. § 206.113. 
 71  In addition to grants for repairs and replacement, there are also two other 
forms of assistance offered under § 5174:  (1) “temporary housing” under § 
5174(c)(1); and (2) “permanent housing construction” for “insular areas outside the 
continental U.S.” under § 5174(c)(4). 
 72 § 5174(c)(2)(A)(i). 
 73  44 C.F.R. § 206.111. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. 
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to insurance proceeds.76  When insurance proceeds are capable of 
covering an individual’s repairs, and where there is no reason to think 
such proceeds will be significantly delayed, the homeowner is not 
eligible for IHP repair grants.77  FEMA is also empowered under the 
IHP to provide “financial assistance for the replacement of owner-
occupied private residences damaged by a major disaster,”78 up to the 
maximum amount of the program’s power.79 
While neither the Stafford Act nor the accompanying regulations 
explicitly detail the types of repairs that are eligible for IHP assistance, 
except to explain that a home must be safe and functional, an 
applicant guide designed by FEMA provides greater detail about the 
types of eligible repairs.80  The guide makes it clear that the standard is 
“safe and sanitary” and that the IHP will not simply “pay to return your 
home to its condition before the disaster.”81  Instead, returning a 
household to a “safe and sanitary condition” may include: (1) fixing 
structural issues like the foundation, outside walls, or roof; (2) 
repairing interior issues like windows, doors, floors, walls, ceilings, and 
cabinetry; and (3) repairing septic and sewage systems, well water and 
other water systems, heating and air conditioning systems, utilities, or 
entrances and exits to a home.82  Thus, while the types of repairs 
available under IHP are many, they relate strictly to the core functions 
of a home.  Despite the long list of available home repairs covered by 
the IHP, monetary relief is capped at $25,000 per household per major 
disaster.83 
On its face, the IHP is designed to assist homeowners following 
major disasters by helping them to return their homes to a merely 
livable, safe condition.  FEMA’s view of community associations, 
however, has substantially limited the program’s effectiveness for a 
great number of homeowners. 
IV. THE GAP IN COVERAGE FOR COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES 
UNDER SECTION 408 OF THE STAFFORD ACT AND HURRICANE SANDY 
In passing the Stafford Act, Congress determined that federal 
 
 76  § 5174(c)(2)(B).  
 77  § 206.113(b)(6). 
 78  § 5174(c)(3)(A). 
 79  Id. § 5174(h)(1)–(2) (the maximum amount is $25,000 per household, but this 
number is subject to adjustment based on the consumer price index). 
 80  See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 37, at 5–6. 
 81  Id.  
 82  Id.  
 83  § 5174(h)(1). 
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assistance was necessary to combat the disruptions to the normal 
functioning of communities and the adverse effects upon individuals 
and families which are created by disasters.84  With respect to owners 
in common interest communities, however, this ambition is not being 
realized. 
In the wake of a natural disaster, an obvious place for community 
associations to start looking for aid would be Section 405 of the 
Stafford Act, which provides grants to private, non-profit facilities.85  
But this approach quickly runs into a road-block.  FEMA regulations 
explicitly state that a private, non-profit facility must be providing 
essential, government-type services to the general public.86  While 
community associations are generally non-profit organizations, they 
are not open to the general public and they only provide services to 
their members.  Not surprisingly, FEMA takes a similar view that 
community organizations are private entities serving private property 
interests.87  One of FEMA’s disaster assistance policies states that a 
private non-profit facility will not meet the “open to the general public” 
standard if membership is restricted to a group of individuals holding 
an economic interest in the organization’s property, offering the 
specific example of a condominium association.88 
Since FEMA, through its regulatory clarification, has foreclosed 
the availability of public assistance grants to community associations,89 
the next most logical place for associations to look would be the IHP, 
described in Part III.90  For purposes of distributing financial assistance 
under the IHP, however, FEMA has determined that community 
associations are not individuals or households, but are instead 
“business associations.”91  Since the IHP will not cover business losses, 
community associations are not able to request assistance grants under 
the program to repair or replace qualifying damages to property over 
which they maintain control.92 
 
 84  § 5121(a)(2). 
 85  § 5172 (a)(3). 
 86  44 C.F.R. § 206.221(e) (West 2013). 
 87  FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, Private NonProfit (PNP) Facility Eligibility, DAP 
9521.3 5 (July 18, 2007), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/pa/ 
9521_3.pdf. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. 
 90  42 U.S.C.A. § 5174 (West 2013). 
 91  See Navarro, supra note 19. 
 92  44 C.F.R. § 206.113(b)(9) (West 2013).  See also Navarro, supra note 19; 
McDermott, supra note 24. 
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While some unit owners in planned communities and detached 
condominium housing may be able to submit individual IHP claims, 
the issue becomes more complicated for condominiums in apartment 
buildings, townhouses, or housing cooperatives where more of the 
physical property is shared.93  This is because elements of their physical 
units, such as roofs, exterior walls, heating and cooling systems, and 
plumbing, are more likely to be shared between members and, thus, 
the domain of the community association.94 
An article from the New York Times, published shortly after 
Sandy, explained the problem concisely: “[C]o-op boards are 
prohibited from obtaining grants for common areas, and individual 
co-op owners cannot seek money for damage to their apartments’ walls 
and floors because those are usually the legal responsibility of the 
building.”95  Highlighting the damage to one particular Brooklyn co-
op, the article goes on to describe, “[T]he wallpaper in the lobby is 
peeling by the yard.  The walls themselves show cracks and holes, as if 
assaulted by a sledgehammer.  The boiler is barely sputtering along 
and may not last the year.”96  One resident and secretary-treasurer of 
the co-op asked, “How can [FEMA] do that? We’re not in business. We 
don’t make a profit . . . I think they don’t realize what co-ops are.”97  
Likewise, the co-president of a 10,000 person cooperative that 
sustained over $250,000 of damage after Sandy lamented, “[i]t is 
unconscionable that FEMA refuses to help the working class 
community of Glen Oaks Village . . . because we are a co-op.”98  He later 
added that “[t]o deny co-ops the ability to obtain FEMA grant money 
simply because of the type of housing choices their residents have 
made is shameful.”99  In a question and answer post on the web-site of 
The New Jersey Cooperator, user “Battered in Brick” inquired about 
FEMA coverage for flood damage that disabled her condominium’s 
boilers and elevators.100  “Battered in Brick” was likely disappointed by 
the reply from attorney Hubert Cutolo, who explained that “a 
condominium association—i.e., a non-profit corporation—would not 
 
 93  See supra text accompanying note 49. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Navarro, supra note 19. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Id. 
 98  See Press Release, supra note 25. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Hubert Cutolo, Q&A: Hurricane-Damaged, THE N.J. COOPERATOR (Feb. 2013), 
http://njcooperator.com/articles/981/1/QampA-Hurricane-Damaged/Page1.html. 
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qualify for disaster aid assistance under IHP.”101 
That this gap in the Stafford Act’s coverage was brought to light 
in the wake of Sandy is no surprise.  New York City is home to the vast 
majority of the housing cooperatives in the United States and, by and 
large, these cooperatives come in the form of owner-occupied 
apartment buildings.102  By one count, there are over 400,000 
cooperative apartments in New York City.103  Another source explains 
that, while a mere 10 percent of the country’s common-interest 
buildings are housing cooperatives, 80 percent of such communities 
found in New York are cooperative apartments.104  Thus, given the high 
concentration of cooperative owners in the area, Sandy’s arrival in New 
York was especially suited to reveal the unique hardship disasters create 
for such homeowners and demonstrate the need for a change in the 
IHP. 
V. THE LEGISLATIVE EFFORT TO FILL THE COVERAGE GAP FOR 
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS, AND WHY IT SHOULD BE PASSED 
In the months following Hurricane Sandy, the need for a change 
in the IHP was quickly apparent.  To those affected, an obvious first 
approach was to call upon FEMA to reevaluate their policy towards 
community organizations applying for IHP aid.105  Congressman Steve 
Israel, a Democrat from New York, sent two letters to the Department 
of Homeland Security and to FEMA, imploring the agencies to 
reevaluate their policy toward homeowners associations.106  
Representative Israel explained his position that “FEMA’s policy is the 
result of not understanding the role of co-ops and condos in our 
community.”107  Likewise, members of housing cooperatives across the 
region expressed a similar view that FEMA should see community 
associations as an extension of the private homeowners that comprise 
them.108  FEMA, however, insists that they are prevented from 
providing relief under the Stafford Act.109 
 
 101  Id. 
 102  See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 41, at 1115 n.16. 
 103  See DUKENMINIER, supra note 18, at 898. 
 104  Schill, Voicu, & Miller, supra note 53, at 276. 
 105  See Israel, supra note 98. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Navarro, supra note 19. 
 109  Mireya Navarro, Bill Would Alter FEMA Policy to Assist Co-Ops and Condos, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 28, 2013) [hereinafter Bill Would Alter FEMA Policy], http://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/07/29/nyregion/us-bill-would-extend-fema-aid-to-co-ops-and-co 
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After failing to convince FEMA to reevaluate its policy on 
community associations, Representative Israel proposed a legislative 
solution; he introduced a bill that would amend the Stafford Act to 
explicitly include condominiums and housing cooperatives in the 
IHP.110 
A. The Legislative Effort to Fill the IHP Coverage Gap 
Representative Israel’s bill, along with an identical bill in the 
Senate sponsored by Senator Charles Schumer of New York,111 states its 
purpose unequivocally: “To amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to provide assistance for 
condominiums and housing cooperatives damaged by a major 
disaster . . . .”112 
The bill starts by adding two definitions to the Stafford Act, one 
for condominiums, and one for housing cooperatives.113  The newly 
added definition of condominium explains: 
The term ‘condominium’ means a multi-unit housing 
project in which each dwelling unit is separately owned, and 
the remaining portions of the real estate are designated for 
common ownership solely by the owners of those units, each 
owner having an undivided interest in the common 
elements, and which is represented by a condominium 
association consisting exclusively of all the unit owners in the 
project, which is, or will be responsible for the operation, 
administration, and management of the project.114 
This definition of condominium is indicative of the standard 
condominium form115 and would likely encompass all condominiums.  
The definition is also careful to define the association so it includes all 
individual unit owners, and only those unit owners.116 
The proposed bill’s newly added definition of housing 
cooperatives reads as follows: 
The term ‘housing cooperative’ means a multi-unit housing 
project in which each dwelling unit is subject to separate use 
and possession by one or more cooperative members whose 
 
ndos.html. 
 110  H.R. 2887, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 111  S. 1480, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 112  Id.; H.R. 2887, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 113  H.R. 2887; S. 1480. 
 114  H.R. 2887; S. 1480. 
 115  See supra text accompanying notes 40–52. 
 116  H.R. 2887; S. 1480. 
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interest in such unit, and in any undivided assets of the 
cooperative association that are appurtenant to such unit, is 
evidenced by a membership or share interest in a cooperative 
association and a lease or other document of title or 
possession granted by such cooperative as the owner of all 
cooperative property.117 
As was the case with condominiums, the proposed definition of 
housing cooperative is consistent with typical understandings of the 
ownership form118 and will bring all homeowners in housing 
cooperatives within its reach. 
Most importantly, the bill adds to § 5174(b)(1) (the IHP) an 
explicit direction to include community associations within the 
umbrella of “individuals and households,” stating: 
For purposes of providing financial assistance under 
subsections (c)(2)[Repairs] and (c)(3)[Replacement] with 
respect to residential elements that are the legal 
responsibility of an association for a condominium or 
housing cooperative, the terms ‘individual’ and ‘household’ 
include the association for the condominium or housing 
cooperative.119 
This addition makes it possible for the community association itself to 
seek aid for damaged common elements instead of the individual 
owners. 
Finally, since the adjustable $25,000 cap on grants in § 5174(h) is 
really only practical for single households, the bill proposes a “Special 
Rule for Condominiums and Housing Cooperatives,” that ultimately 
leaves its meaning to be determined by the President through 
regulation.120 
Representative Israel, after proposing the legislation, explained, 
“[a] storm does not discriminate where it hits, and FEMA should not 
be discriminating what type of homeowners it helps.”121  Other voices 
in New York have echoed Israel’s sentiment in support of the bill.  New 
York State Senator Tony Avella agrees, arguing that “homeowners of 
every kind deserve the same FEMA assistance when a storm hits.”122  
Mark Weprin, a New York City councilman, adds that, “[c]o-op 
residents deserve equal access to federal funds for repairs like those 
 
 117  H.R. 2887; S. 1480. 
 118  See supra text accompanying notes 53–65. 
 119  H.R. 2887; S. 1480. 
 120  H.R. 2887; S. 1480. 
 121  See Israel, supra note 98. 
 122  Id. 
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needed after Hurricane Sandy.  I thank Congress Member Israel for 
introducing this legislation.”123  In support of the bill, the Community 
Association Institute issued a call to action on its website, asserting that 
“[condominium and cooperative] homeowners and communities 
deserve the same disaster relief as any other homeowner and any other 
neighborhood.”124  These voices of support for the bill share a common 
realization that, with respect to the purpose of the IHP, homeowners 
in common interest communities are not meaningfully different from 
traditional homeowners. Denying coverage for community 
associations under the IHP is essentially the same as denying it to 
individual homeowners. 
B. The Proposed Amendments Reflect a More Reasonable View of 
Community Associations and Should be Passed 
By designating community associations as businesses, FEMA has 
created an obvious hardship to homeowners in condominiums and 
housing cooperatives.125  A more reasonable view of the entity would 
recognize that community associations are inseparable from their 
members.  The appropriateness of this view becomes even more 
pronounced when taken in the context of disaster relief.  The repair 
and replacement provisions of the IHP were intended to assist those 
living in “owner-occupied private residences” following major 
disasters.126  Thus, blocking IHP grants to cooperatives and community 
associations is sensible only if there is something peculiar to their 
ownership type that removes them from the realm of mere 
homeowners or that uniquely equips them, relative to traditional 
homeowners, to recover from the disasters.  There is no reason to 
believe, however, that this is the case.  Ultimately, the best view of 
community associations is as extensions of the individual, private home 
owners of which they are comprised. 
To be sure, the issue is not clear cut, and FEMA is not the first to 
struggle in assigning a legal identity to the ownership form.127  At 
 
 123  Id. 
 124  Michael Hedge, Call to Action-Condominium and Cooperative Disaster Relief, 
COMMUNITY. ASS’N INST. (July 29, 2013, 3:38 PM), http://www.caionline.org/ 
govt/news/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=82. 
 125  See Navarro, supra note 19. 
 126  42 U.S.C.A. § 5174(c)(2)–(3) (West 2013). 
 127  See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 853 (1975); Susan 
F. French, Making Common Interest Communities Work: The Next Step, 37 URB. LAW. 359, 
362–65 (2005) (examining the legally confusing similarities and differences between 
community associations and private businesses, private associations, and local 
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various times, and in different contexts, community associations have 
been viewed as businesses, governmental-type entities, or simply 
private associations.128  Similarly, individual rights holders in 
cooperatives have been viewed as renters, investors, and most 
appropriately, as holders of real property.129  No doubt, much of the 
confusion associated with the form of ownership results from the fact 
that community associations often resemble corporate entities in both 
name and governance.130  A closer look at both the make-up and the 
role of community associations, however, reveals that, while perhaps 
analogous to businesses in some superficial aspects, a much more 
realistic view of the community association is as an extension of the 
homeowner. 
In advocating for the passage of Representative Israel’s proposed 
amendments to the Stafford Act, the remainder of this part explains 
first why cooperative stock ownership should be viewed, for practical 
purposes, as home ownership.  The focus then turns to an explanation 
of why a view of community associations as businesses is inconsistent 
with the views espoused by a number of courts.  Finally, the remainder 
of this Comment explains how, in the specific context of disaster relief, 
a view of community associations which denies them characterization 
as home owners works a particular hardship to the members of such 
communities, a hardship that can only be remedied by passage of 
Representative Israel’s amendments. 
1. Cooperative Stock as Real-Estate Ownership 
Housing cooperatives present a special issue for individual 
ownership because the only right that the individual technically holds 
is title to stock in the cooperative corporation, which in turn holds the 
actual title.131  This peculiar property arrangement raises questions 
about the nature of the individual’s ownership interest.132 
While recognizing the ambiguous nature of cooperative 
 
governments). 
 128  See, e.g., French, supra note 127, at 362–65. 
 129  See Forman, 421 U.S. at 853; see also Kadera v. Superior Court, 931 P.2d 1067, 
1073–74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Anton Sattler, Inc. v. Cummings, 425 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). 
 130  See French, supra note 127, at 363. 
 131  See Schill, supra note 17, at 277. 
 132  David S. Wilson, First-Aid for Housing the Low- and Fixed-Income Elderly: The Case for 
Resuscitating Cooperative Housing, 15 ELDER L.J. 293, 304 (2007) (describing that “[o]ne 
main problem that cooperative housing has faced is the difficulty of classifying the type 
of interest a buyer obtains when purchasing a cooperative ownership interest”). 
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ownership, a number of courts facing these definitional issues have 
opted to place substance over form, ignoring semantic and technical 
distinctions, to find that cooperative shareholders are more akin to 
real property owners than mere renters or investors.  In United Housing 
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, for example, the Supreme Court was forced 
to answer the question of whether residents’ shares in a housing 
cooperative, referred to as “stock” when purchased, constituted 
“securities,” bringing them within the purview of the Securities Act of 
1933133 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.134  The Securities Act 
of 1933 defines “security” broadly and includes in its definition the 
phrase “any stock.”135  Despite this clear language, the Court held that 
“form should be disregarded for substance,” insisting that “the 
emphasis should be economic reality.”136 
With a view targeting “economic reality,” the court explained, 
“[c]ommon sense suggests that people who intend to acquire only a 
residential apartment in a state-subsidized cooperative, for their 
personal use, are not likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing 
investment securities simply because the transaction is evidenced by 
something called a share of stock.”137  In determining the nature of the 
individual’s property interest, the Court made clear that reducing the 
issue to a literal examination of the chosen nomenclature, in this case 
a “stock,” is misplaced.138 
Other courts have dealt with the definitional problems of co-op 
ownership similarly, focusing on the practical realities attendant to the 
ownership form.139  In a particularly thorough opinion, an Arizona 
Court of Appeals refused to “exalt form over substance in real property 
transactions,” and held that a cooperator acquires a real property 
interest when he purchases shares in a cooperative.140  The court 
explained that, with the exception of the fact that there is no title 
 
 133  Forman, 421 U.S. at 844. 
 134  Id. at 845. 
 135  15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1) (West 2013). 
 136  Forman, 421 U.S. at 848 (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 
(1967)). 
 137  Id. at 851. 
 138  See Wilson, supra note 132, at 311 (“In Forman [sic], the Court recognized that 
the most important characteristic of a housing cooperative is that it is a home.”).  
 139  See, e.g., Kadera v. Superior Court, 931 P.2d 1067 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Anton 
Sattler, Inc. v. Cummings, 425 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding that a 
cooperator possesses a proprietary lease, which is a real property interest for purposes 
of the statute of frauds, but that the cooperator is subject to the rights and duties set 
forth in the proprietary lease). 
 140  Kadera, 931 P.2d at 1074. 
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transfer, the stock purchase possesses all of the indicia of a real estate 
transaction.141  In the particular facts of the Arizona case, for instance, 
the purchaser chose a preferred location and neighborhood, provided 
a sizable initial investment, possessed an exclusive right to occupy the 
unit, and held an interest that was both devisable and assignable.142 In 
other words, the court was, again, willing to delve below the superficial 
and view the “stock purchase” for what it was: a real estate purchase. 
 
 
 
2. Community Associations are Inseparable Extensions of 
Their Members 
While housing cooperative members present a special issue in 
receiving grants for repairs to their individual apartments, the bigger 
issue, and the issue with which Congressman Israel’s legislation143 deals, 
is FEMA’s purported inability under the Stafford Act to offer IHP 
grants to any community associations, including cooperative 
corporations.144  Like a literal view of housing cooperative members, a 
formalistic view of community associations as businesses is misguided 
and fails to adequately consider the association’s make-up and 
functions. 
There is no doubt that much of the impetus behind the desire to 
view community associations as business entities comes from the fact 
that they are typically organized as corporations under state corporate 
law; if viewed in isolation, however, that label is misleading.145  As an 
initial matter, community associations are almost always chartered as 
non-profits.146  Associations function to protect their resident’s 
interests as property owners, not to maximize profits.147  Further, unlike 
profit driven corporate entities, community associations are comprised 
 
 141  Id.  
 142  Id. at 1074–75. 
 143  H.R. 2887, 113th Cong. (2013); see also S. 1480, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 144  See Bill Would Alter FEMA Policy, supra note 109. 
 145  See Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 342 (1998) (“Most community associations created today are 
incorporated under the not-for-profit corporation law of the state in which they 
operate.”); see also HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 41, at 3. 
 146  See Hyatt, supra note 145, at 342.   
 147  Kristin L. Davidson, Bankruptcy Protection for Community Associations as Debtors, 20 
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 583, 599 (2004) (“Unlike the goal of typical shareholders to 
maximize profits, members of associations have varied concerns relating to their living 
environment.”). 
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entirely of the residents they represent and are likewise controlled by 
a board of directors assembled from, and elected by, members of the 
same association.148  In fact, these officers and directors are not paid, 
their service is not typically treated as a career, and in many cases they 
have no formal training.149 
Some courts, recognizing the unique character of community 
associations, are wary of viewing them strictly as businesses.150  
Generally, in corporate law, when a shareholder contests a board’s 
decision, courts will apply the business judgment rule.151  Premised on 
the belief that a risk of liability will discourage boards from taking the 
type of risks necessary to maximize their value, the business judgment 
rule works to insulate boards from liability.152  The Delaware Supreme 
Court explains that the rule represents a “presumption that in making 
a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company.”153  The business 
judgment rule rests on a judicial deference to corporate boards, 
essentially allowing them to take whatever actions they believe are in 
the best interest of the company.154 
Despite the fact that community associations are technically 
incorporated entities, not all courts have afforded them the generous 
cover of the business judgment rule, a reality demonstrated by their 
use of a reasonability standard to review association decisions.155  One 
court applying a reasonability standard explained that associations 
“must balance individual interests against the general welfare” of the 
community at large.156  Implicit in the decision to test the reasonability 
 
 148  Id. at 592.  
 149  See French, supra note 127, at 364. 
 150  See Davidson, supra note 147. 
 151  See Hyatt, supra note 145, at 345–46. 
 152  See WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN, & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, 
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 231–32 (4th ed. 
2012); see also Hyatt, supra note 145, at 346. 
 153  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 154  See ALLEN, supra note 152. 
 155  See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Cal. 
1994) (holding that courts must enforce covenants, conditions and restrictions unless 
they are unreasonable); Cohen v. Kite Hill Cmty. Assn., 142 Cal. App. 3d 642, 652 (Ct. 
App. 1983) (holding that association’s decision not to permit homeowner’s building 
of a fence would be overturned only if it were arbitrary); Hidden Harbour Ests., Inc. v. 
Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that only reasonable 
association decisions will be upheld; arbitrary and capricious rules with no relation to 
a unit owner’s health, happiness, or enjoyment of their property will be overturned). 
 156  Cohen, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 653. 
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of an association’s decision is a revelation by courts that, unlike a 
typical corporation, associations have a “tremendous impact on the 
personal lives and homes of the association’s residents.”157  In fact, 
courts and commentators alike have argued that community 
associations often function more like governmental bodies than like 
businesses.158  This analogy, likening community associations to local 
governments, is more helpful to understanding an association’s true 
character than one likening it to a business entity.159 
Governments, at their best, exist to represent the populace from 
which they draw their power, to act in the best interest of the collective.  
Community associations, similarly, exist as extensions of their 
individual property owners.  Reflecting this view, the California Court 
of Appeals explained in Cohen, “[l]ike any community, [the community 
association] consists of individual members who form in the aggregate 
an organic whole.”160  Instead of viewing the association and its 
property owners as wholly distinct entities, the court recognized that 
the latter are inseparable parts of the former.161  This is not to say that 
community associations should be viewed simply as private 
governments,162 nor does the Cohen court imply that.163  The analogy to 
government simply offers a conceptual aid to understanding how 
community associations function with respect to their members. 
3. Denying IHP Grants to Community Associations Violates 
Basic Fairness 
The aptness of an analogy to government, and its use by courts, 
reveals the need to re-characterize the superficial view of community 
 
 157  See Davidson, supra note 147, at 599. 
 158  See, e.g., Cohen, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 651; Davidson, supra note 147, at 599; HYATT 
& FRENCH, supra note 145, at 3–4 (explaining that local municipalities have often 
favored creation of common interest communities because they receive the benefit of 
an increased tax base while the community association assumes many of the 
responsibilities otherwise reserved for municipal governments).  See also French, supra 
note 127, at 362.  French argues that, while also different from government in some 
respects, community associations manage communal property such as parks and 
streets, enforce land use restrictions similar to local zoning boards, levy assessments 
akin to property taxes, and supply services like utilities, snow removal, and security.  Id. 
 159  While the analogy is helpful, it is not complete.  Community associations only 
serve to benefit their property-owning private residents.  On the other hand, municipal 
governments serve entire communities.  See Davidson, supra note 147, at 600. 
 160  Cohen, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 653. 
 161  Id. 
 162  See supra note 159. 
 163  The court simply analogized a community association’s approval of a fence to a 
municipal zoning board’s granting of a variance.  Cohen, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 652. 
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associations as mere businesses.  The need for a definitional shift is 
even more pronounced when viewed in the context of disaster relief.  
As described earlier, community associations consist exclusively of 
individual owners, their boards are comprised of and elected by 
members of the association, and much of their decision-making is 
governed by majority rule.164  Most importantly, the community 
association functions almost entirely with the money it raises in 
assessments from its own members.165  Consequently, when an 
association faces an emergency, it is, in reality, its member-
homeowners who face an emergency.166 
The community association exists for the purpose of representing 
its members’ interests as homeowners; thus, harm to the association is 
necessarily harm to its members. The Court of Appeals of New York 
espoused this view of community associations in Neponsit Property 
Owners’ Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, a seminal case in 
the development of common interest communities.167 Affirmatively 
answering the question of whether community associations could 
enforce covenants running with the land on behalf of their members 
(in this case, the payment of dues), the court explained that 
community associations were formed as “a convenient instrument by 
which the property owners may advance their common interests.”168  To 
the Neponsit court, then, community associations were an extension of 
their members, and the association was simply a convenient way to 
represent their interests as homeowners.169  If the Stafford Act is 
directed at protecting homeowners from the tragedies attendant to 
disasters by helping them repair and replace their homes, refusing to 
provide aid to community associations runs directly contrary to that 
goal, because a hardship to the association is a hardship to the 
individual owner.170 
 
 164  See French, supra note 127 at 363–64. 
 165  Id. at 362.  
 166  See Davidson, supra note 147, at 608 (“If emergency costs to repair the common 
elements exceed the insurance coverage, the governing documents of a community 
association typically provide the association with power to levy and collect special 
assessments.”). 
 167  Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 798 
(N.Y. 1938); see also Andrew Russell, The Tenth Anniversary of the Restatement (Third) of 
Property, Servitudes: A Progress Report, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 753, 759 (2011) (describing 
Neponsit as “the seminal case validating homeowners associations as beneficiaries of 
association fees”). 
 168  Neponsit, 15 N.E.2d at 798. 
 169  See Russell, supra note 168, at 759. 
 170  42 U.S.C.A. § 5174 (b)(1) (West 2013). 
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There is no reason to think that extending IHP coverage to 
community associations offers any unique benefits to homeowners in 
common interest communities.  Representative Israel’s amendment 
does not lift any restrictions on the type of repairs and replacements 
eligible for grants under the IHP program.171  Just like the grants 
available to traditional homeowners, grants offered to community 
associations under the amendments will be for the limited purpose of 
returning homes to a “safe and sanitary” condition.172  There is no 
special benefit conferred upon homeowners in common interest 
communities under the amended version of the Stafford Act. 
Despite their reliance on community associations, homeowners in 
common interest communities are not substantially better equipped to 
respond to emergencies than traditional homeowners.  While many 
community associations will have insurance policies that protect 
against certain emergencies, such policies are not likely to anticipate 
all emergencies.173  In the event that repair costs exceed the policy’s 
coverage, the excess will be covered by special assessments drawn from 
the pockets of individual owners.174  Further, responsible homeowners 
not living in community associations can also insure their homes from 
disasters.  In fact, as presently constituted, the IHP anticipates that 
qualified homeowners might have insurance, but it does not deny 
them coverage on that ground.175 
 While it is also true that community associations often develop 
reserve funds for emergent repairs and needs,176 it is important to 
recognize that these funds generally anticipate predictable costs, like 
repairing common roofs or other long-term projects.177  Further, these 
funds are supplied with money raised by the association through 
assessments on residents.178  While the administration of the reserve 
fund is necessarily formal when administered by a community 
association, it is, in essence, nothing more than a budgetary strategy 
that most responsible homeowners can and should practice, even if in 
a less formal capacity. 
 
 171  H.R. 2887, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1480, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 172  H.R. 2887; S. 1480. 
 173  See Davidson, supra note 147, at 608. 
 174  Id.  
 175  42 U.S.C.A. § 5174 (c)(2)(B)(West 2013). 
 176  See HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 41, at 341. 
 177  See id. at 342 (explaining that boards should consider the number of replaceable 
assets, anticipate the expected life, and set the contribution amount from members to 
meet those eventual needs). 
 178  Id. at 341. 
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Reserve funds and insurance policies aside, the reality is that when 
a major disaster strikes, homeowners in common interest communities 
are left to bear the costs just like any other homeowner.179  When there 
is damage to a common element under the legal control of a 
community association, however, the Stafford Act is not armed to offer 
the same repair grants it offers traditional homeowners.180  So while the 
cost of repairing commonly held property ultimately falls to the 
individual owners in a community, the designation of their associations 
as businesses prevents those individual owners from receiving the same 
grants as similarly situated traditional homeowners.181 
 
 
Characterizing community associations as businesses not only 
runs contrary to the substantive realities of the ownership form, it 
creates a result that violates basic fairness.  This lack of fairness is even 
more glaring when considered alongside the reality that many 
residents who live in common interest communities are doing so out 
of necessity and not because of any meaningful choice on their part.182  
The number of common interest communities in the United States 
continues to grow each year, and in many areas housing markets are 
saturated with common interest communities.183  As a result, this trend 
has deprived many homebuyers of meaningful choice.184 
Adding to the unfairness of this reality, it is worth noting that 
much of the growth of common interest communities in housing 
markets across the country has been fueled by local governments.185  
Local governments favor common interest communities because it 
allows them to widen their tax base while at the same time providing 
fewer services than they would if traditionally owned homes were 
built.186  As local governments continue to struggle with budget crises 
of their own, it is likely that this trend will continue,187 placing more 
 
 179  See Davidson, supra note 147, at 608–09 (“Special assessments are risky for the 
financial stability of a community association because they have not been anticipated 
by the association or budgeted into the personal finance costs of members.”). 
 180  See Navarro, supra note 19. 
 181  Id. 
 182  See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 41, at 1124–25; see also Hyatt, supra note 145, 
at 312. 
 183  See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 41, at 1125.  
 184  See id. at 1125. 
 185  See id. at 1119–24; HYATT& FRENCH, supra note 41, at 3–4.   
 186  See HYATT& FRENCH, supra note 41, at 3–4. 
 187  Id. 
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and more homeowners in the coverage gap created by their non-
inclusion in the Stafford act’s IHP program. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Stafford Act, as presently constituted, unfairly excludes 
community associations from its IHP.188  This exclusion is the result of 
an overly formal interpretation of community associations as business 
entities.189  While such an interpretation may be superficially 
comprehensible, it distorts the reality that community associations are 
inseparable from the individual homeowners they represent.  Thus, 
the exclusion of community associations from IHP coverage results in 
the practical exclusion of individual homeowners from the very relief 
the program purports to offer.  The hardship created by this gap in 
coverage is uniquely apparent in the wake of Hurricane Sandy, where 
thousands of condominium and cooperative owners were told they 
were not eligible for the same grants as similarly situated traditional 
home owners.190 
The amendment to the Stafford Act that has been introduced in 
both houses of Congress would remedy this clear inequity.191  The 
amendment allows cooperative corporations and condominium 
associations to seek coverage under the IHP program.192  Since a 
community association is properly viewed as a collective of 
homeowners, this amendment offers no new benefits to anyone the 
Stafford Act’s IHP program purported to assist in the first place.  
Cooperative Corporations and Condominium associations will qualify 
for exactly the same types of repairs and replacements as traditional 
homeowners, allowing them to bring their homes back to safe and 
sanitary conditions.193 
 
 
 
 
 188  See Navarro, supra note 19. 
 189  Id. 
 190  See Navarro, supra note 19. 
 191  H.R. 2887, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1480, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 192  H.R. 2887); S. 1480. 
 193  42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5174 (c)(2)–(3) (West 2013). 
